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The Child's Capacity to Consent
to Medical and Psychiatric Treatment
by James Turner
To be able to readily obtain medical
and psychiatric treatment when
needed is important to everyone.
However, minors, with certain ex-
ceptions, may be denied such treat-
ment unless they are able to obtain
parental consent. In recent years,
minor children have gained some
degree of legal recognition as active
participants in the medical treatment
process; however the appropriate
extent of their participation has not
yet been fully delineated and the legal
standards governing their participa-
tion remain in flux.
Generally, the legal principles gov-
erning the relationship between the
physician and the patient are found in
an analysis of the tort of battery, the
willful touching of another without
consent. 6A C.J.S. Assault & Battery.
§ 7B (1975). Courts have consistently
held that a doctor's unauthorized treat-
ment of a patient constitutes a bat-
tery. Oakes v. Gilday, 351 A.2d 85 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1976).
In tort law, a defense to an action of
battery is that the alleged injured
party consented to, or participated in,
the acts causing the injury. Seigel v.
Long, 169 Ala. 79, 53 S. 753 (1910).
This consent may be either express or
implied. O'Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 154
Mass. 272, 28, 266 (1891). The gen-
eral rule has been that when the
patient is a minor, the express or
implied consent of a parent or a
guardian is necessary for the authori-
zation of medical or psychiatric
treatment.
In Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121
(D.C. Cir. 1941), a physician was sued
for performing surgery on a fifteen
year old boy without his parent's
knowledge and with only the child's
consent. Based on the common law
rule, the court held that absent special
circumstances (exceptions provided
by statute), such a procedure consti-
tuted a battery, regardless of the
results of the surgery.
It was thought that children lacked
the capacity to provide consent for
purposes of avoiding a battery. Courts
held that until children reached major-
ity, usually at the age of 21, only a
parent or a legal guardian could give
effective consent to medical treat-
ment. The law assumed that minors
were not wise or mature enough to
determine their medical needs and a
parent was often vested with control
over the child. Younts v. St. Francis Hosp.
and School of Nursing, Inc. 205 Kan. 292,
469 P.2d 330 (1970).
The requirement of parental con-
sent was partially based on the notion
that the right of parents to control
their minor child constituted a prop-
erty right. The parental consent re-
quirement was also supported by the
belief that it promoted family har-
mony, discipline and authority. Com-
monwealth v. Brasher, 359 Mass. 550,
270 N.E.2d 389 (1971).
As can be imagined, the require-
ment of parental consent in accor-
dance with the common law rule had
the potential of harsh results. For
example, minors who were economi-
cally independent of their parents
might be subject to the requirement
of obtaining parental consent before
obtaining medical or psychiatric treat-
ment, even though they were func-
tioning as adults in society. Perhaps
more importantly, a minor could have
been faced with the possibility of
increased injury in the event that
prompt medical care was needed and
the parents could not be found to
consent to the treatment. Roe v. Doe,
29 N.Y.2d 188, 272 N.E.2d 567, 324
N.Y.S.2d 71 (1971).
Because of the potential for such
unfortunate results, certain excep-
tions began to emerge. One such ex-
ception is that of "emergency," where
delay in providing prompt care could
be critical. Bonner, 126 F.2d at 122.
Thus, courts have been reluctant to
apply the rule requiring express par-
ental consent in emergency medical
situations. Medical personnel who
have provided the necessary medical
treatment during emergency situa-
tions have been protected by the
courts from lawsuits arising from
such treatment. Wells v. McGehee, 39
So.2d 196 (1949); Sullivan v. Montgom-
ery, 155 Misc. 448, 279 N.Y.S. 575
(1935).
It should be pointed out that the
consent of a minor in an emergency
situation was of no importance to the
primary decision to provide medical
treatment. The courts have generally
concluded that consent is implied
from the emergency itself. Ollet v. Pitts-
burgh C. C. & St.L. Ry., 201 Pa. 361, 50
A. 1101 (1902).
Emergency conditions include those
which would result in severe hemor-
rhage, respiratory obstruction, in-
creased intracranial pressure, or any
other condition which poses an im-
mediate threat to life or to limb. Jack-
ovach v. Yocum, 212 Iowa 914, 237 N.W.
444 (1931).
Another exception to the parental
consent requirement is that of eman-
cipation. This is the legal recognition
that a minor is free from the care,
custody, and control of his parents.
Courts have considered a minor to be
emancipated when he/she is married,
is in the military, or is economically
independent. McGregor v. McGregor,
237 Ga. 57, 226 S.E.2d 591 (1979).
Still another exception is that of
the "mature minor," defined as one
who is sufficiently intelligent and
mature to understand the nature and
consequences of the medical treat-
ment being sought. Zoski v. Gaines, 271
Mich. 1, 260 N.W. 99 (1935). How-
ever, courts have set up some general
parameters. The mature minor ex-
ception is generally applicable only if
the minor is at least fifteen years old
and has intelligence, understanding,
and independence of action. In addi-
tion, the medical treatment being
sought must not be of a serious
nature. Younts, 205 Kan. 292, 469 P.2d
330 (1970).
The Child's Interests
Primarily, the equal protection and
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due process guarantees of the Four-
teenth Amendment have provided the
basis for the expanded recognition of
the capacity of minors to consent to
medical and psychiatric treatment.
Supreme Court decisions on the issues
of pregnancy and abortion have served
as the main vehicles for the expansion
of these rights. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973), the Court invalidated a
Texas criminal abortion statute and
held that it was violative of due
process. The Court also established
that there is a fundamental privacy
right of a woman to decide with her
physician whether to terminate her
pregnancy.
In Planned Parenthood of Central Mis-
souri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976),
the Court found that the parental
consent provision was an unconstitu-
tional delegation to a third person of a
veto power over the minor's decision
to abort. The Court affirmed that a
minor does have the capacity to pro-
vide consent in matters pertaining to
medical care. This case is of primary
significance because the minor's right
of privacy in these matters is given
express recognition. The Danforth case
is also significant because the Court
opted to rule in favor of the minor
over the state's arguments that dis-
cipline and the state's interest in
promoting family unity and harmony
outweighed the minor's privacy right
to obtain medical care.
With respect to psychiatric care,
the minor's consent capacity has also
been expanded. In the leading case of
Parham v. J.L., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), a
Georgia statute provided that a minor
could be signed into a hospital by a
parent or a guardian "if found to
show evidence of mental illness and
to be suitable for treatment." The
only discharge mechanism, in addi-
tion to that provided by the hospital
before the minor reached eighteen
years of age, was by the application of
the parent or the guardian.
Two minors filed suit alleging that
they and others similarly situated had
been deprived of their liberty without
due process by the Georgia statute.
The Supreme Court held that the
children had been institutionalized
without a hearing or other procedu-
ral safeguards, and that they had not
been afforded a hearing to determine
an appropriate time for discharge.
The Court also held that the minors
had been hospitalized without initial
or periodic consideration of placement
in the least restrictive environment
necessary for treatment. The Court
felt that the case essentially involved
a balancing of three competing inter-
ests: the child's liberty interest, the
parents' interest in the welfare and
the health of the child; and the state's
significant interest in properly utiliz-
ing its mental health facilities.
In the leading Maryland case, John-
son v. Solomon, 484 F. Supp. 278 (4th
Cir. 1979), the standards set forth by
the Maryland statute regarding the
civil commitment of minors to mental
institutions were held to be imper-
missibly vague and unconstitutional
as violative of due process and equal
protection since they did not require a
finding that a juvenile is dangerous to
himself and others and did not gua-
rantee that the commitment would
bear a rational relationship to the
underlying parens patriae principle jus-
tifying the loss of liberty. The Federal
District Court of Maryland held that
the state had to establish new pro-
cedures for the civil commitment of
minors to mental institutions and also
held that the least restrictive alter-
native must be explored before a
Maryland juvenile court can civilly
commit a minor to a mental institu-
tion. Id. at 313.
The Parents' Interests
Because children were historically
presumed to be incapable of making
reasonable decisions regarding their
own medical treatment, consent of
the parents has been the legal substi-
tute for the minors' consent. The
rationale is that children were pro-
tected against the possibility of their
own improvident decisions or un-
scrupulous medical care. Also, the
doctor was relieved from liability for
treatment without consent. Bonner v.
Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (S.C. Cir. 1941).
In Craig v. State, 220 Md. 590 (1959),
155 A.2d 684, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland affirmed the involuntary
manslaughter conviction of parents
who failed to supply medical care for
their child who had a fatal illness. The
parents had claimed that their reli-
gion prevented them from providing
the required medical care. The Court
held that the parents are required to
obey the mandate of statutes wherein
they are charged with the care and
welfare of their minor children by
providing medical care when neces-
sary. Id.. at 600, 155 A.2d at 691.
In Matter of Smith, 16 Md. App. 209,
295 A.2d 238 (1972), a sixteen year
old unmarried, pregnant female who
was found by the circuit court (Juve-
nile) to be a "Child in Need of Super-
vision" (CINS), was placed in the cus-
tody of her mother, and was ordered
to submit to an abortion despite her
wishes to bring the pregnancy to
term. The appellate court overruled
the juvenile court and held that ir-
respective of the mother's wishes, the
girl could not be compelled to submit
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to abortion procedures.
In re Phillip B, 442 U.S. 584 (1979),
the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the common law doctrine
permitting parents to refuse non-
emergency medical treatment for
their unemancipated children. A Cali-
fornia Superior Court had dismissed
the petition of the state's juvenile
probation division to have a twelve-
year-old boy suffering from Down's
Syndrome declared a dependent of
the state so that he could receive car-
diac surgery over the objection of his
parents. Although the prognosis for
the boy was poor without the surgery,
the Court sided with the parents and
based its decision on the parental con-
sent theory.
The State's Interest
The State acts on behalf of the child
under the doctrine of parens patriae.
Under this doctrine, the State may
intervene within the family unit in
order to protect the child's interests.
This doctrine originated with the
Courts of Chancery in England, due
to a desire to protect the property and
morals of children whose parents
were considered unfit. The doctrine
was enlarged to allow the State to
overrule parental objections to medi-
cal treatment by relying on the old
English doctrine that medical care is
one of the necessities of life, and
parents must provide it for their
minor children. Eyre v. Countess of
Shaftsbury, 24 Eng. Rep. 659 (Ch. 1722).
The state, through the use of its
authority as parens patriae and the police
power, has to be considered as an
active participant in the balancing of
interests. Under the police power,
states have imposed mandatory vac-
cination programs for minors. Zucht v.
King 1260 U.S. 174 (1922). The United
States Supreme Court has held that
this type of exercise by the state con-
stitutes a "reasonable and proper
exercise of police power." Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
Newborn testing and screening (the
administration of eyedrops within an
hour or two of birth), and the florida-
tion of public water supplies to pre-
vent tooth decay in children, exem-
plify how states have used their police
power to insure that medical treat-
ment is provided to minors. Kaul v.
Chehalis, 45 Wash.2d 616, 277 P.2d
352 (1954).
In the State of Maryland, the Legis-
lature has enacted statutes providing
that minors can obtain medical treat-
ment independently. Where a minor
is married, pregnant or has a venereal
disease, he/she may consent to medi-
cal or surgical care MD. ANN. CODE art.
43, §135 (a) (1980 rep. vol.). Maryland
juvenile courts may order that a child
be studied or examined by a physician,
psychiatrist, or psychologist after a
petition has been filed in juvenile
court. MD. ANN. CODE, Courts and Judi-
cial Proceedings, §3-818 (b) (1980 rep.
vol.). After adjudication of a petition,
the juvenile court may also order that
the child be committed to the custody
of the Department of Health and
Mental Hygiene for care and treat-
ment. Id., §3-820(e), (f), (g) (1980 rep.
vol.). Further, the juvenile court may
order that emergency, dental, or sur-
gical treatment be provided to a child
suffering from some condition or
illness, §3-822 (1980 rep. vol.). In
addition, a child may refuse to partici-
pate in or submit to an abortion. MD.
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ANN. CODE art. 43, §138 (a) (1980 rep.
vol.); Matter of Smith, 16 Md. Appl. 209,
295 A.2d 238 (1976).
Conclusion
The right of privacy requires that a
minor child who is intelligent and
mature enough to consent should not
be treated differently than adults with
respect to medical and psychiatric
care. This represents a departure from
the harsh common law rule of strict
parental consent.
Courts still must balance the three
competing interests of the child, the
state, and the parents. While the state
may create procedures to insure that
the minor is competent to consent, it
cannot delegate to third parties, such
as parents, the absolute power to veto
an informed consent decision by a
"mature minor." The era of absolute
parental control over the power of
the minor to seek medical and psychi-
atric care is coming to an end. It must
be noted, however, that the children
who are not "mature" minors and
who do not fall under one of the state
or court-provided exceptions will
probably find their parents' consent
substituted for that of their own.
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